version v0.1 · 9 September 2026
← 02 The model [link removed: 02__the-model.md:] · Next → 04 The worked example [link removed: 04__the-worked-example.md:]
How to read this file
Two columns matter more than the rest: what state the corpus is in, and who says so.
Rows marked in the estate were read from that vault's or site's own published page on 9 September 2026 and the figures are quoted from it. Rows marked candidate are named from general knowledge and nothing about their structure has been checked — they are a work list, not an inventory, and treating them as one would be the exact failure this estate keeps a claim ledger to prevent.
What already exists as a graph, in this estate
| Standard | Where | Shape, as its own page states it | State |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIUC-1 (agent standard) | aiuc-1-graph vault 2wzct4k7 | 53 controls, 144 requirements, 1,126 crosswalks, 1,238 nodes, 3,526 edges over five releases; every field names the page or commit it was read from with the sha256 of the retrieved bytes | the richest thing we have |
| AIUC-1 conformance | aiuc-1-conformance 2wzct4k7 | A fork adding one directory: attested_by kept permanently apart from evidenced_by, 53 conformance rows, insurability as a query | the layer everything else should imitate |
| EU AI Act — as parsed law | regulation-graph 73heuprz | Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 parsed from official Formex XML, hash-verified to source bytes, 1,523 nodes and 1,944 edges across eleven views | the model for instrument parsing |
| EU AI Act — as current text | eu-ai-act.standards.riskmandate.ai | The composed current text with the Digital Omnibus applied by a gated parser. Per-provision ids, statuses and sha256, rolling to a root hash; .md and .llm.json on every slug; JSON-LD and Turtle exports | the instrument layer, solved |
| GDPR | standards-atlas-gdpr 4zv4bvmu | GDPR as a navigable semantic graph, with CJEU rulings, regulator guidance and per-country variation as first-class nodes layered over the articles they bend | the model for jurisdictional variation |
Read that table as the answer to "can this be done". Two regulations and one standard are already graphs with byte-level provenance. The method is proven; what is missing is breadth and an anchor.
AIUC-1's thirteen, read from its own graph
Blocker S1 is closed. The pack said this was the cheapest thing to check and it was: the crosswalk targets are in graph/edges.json of vault 2wzct4k7, opened with its published read key. 1,126 crosswalks across exactly thirteen frameworks, counted from the edges themselves:
| Framework | in_framework | crosswalks | Kind |
|---|---|---|---|
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | 360 | 320 | control set |
| IBM AI Risk Atlas | 138 | 145 | risk taxonomy |
| ISO/IEC 42001 | 124 | 105 | management system |
| NIST AI RMF | 110 | 152 | framework |
| Cisco AI Security Framework | 80 | 135 | vendor framework |
| EU AI Act | 54 | 62 | law |
| MITRE ATLAS | 34 | 32 | threat taxonomy |
| OWASP Top 10 (for LLM Applications) | 20 | 60 | threat list |
| OWASP Agentic Top 10 | 20 | 55 | threat list |
| OWASP AIVSS | 20 | 27 | scoring |
| NYC Local Law 144 | 8 | 6 | law |
| Colorado AI Act | 6 | 18 | law |
| California SB 53 | 4 | 9 | law |
One row needs its label read carefully. framework:owasp-top-10 is labelled "OWASP Top 10", which reads as the web application list. Its members are not: they are LLM01:25 - Prompt Injection through LLM10:25 - Unbounded Consumption — the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025). Checked by listing the ten in_framework members rather than trusting the label, which is the only reason the AI-specific finding below survives. A shorthand label that collides with a different, better-known standard is the kind of thing an anchor node exists to disambiguate, and it is worth reporting upstream rather than silently working around.
Two findings, and the second is the important one.
One: the coverage is AI-specific, not general security
Not one general security control set is in that list. No NIST CSF, no NIST SP 800-53, no ISO/IEC 27001 or 27002, no SOC 2, no CIS Controls, no PCI DSS, no HIPAA, no FedRAMP.
That is not a gap in AIUC-1 — it is an agent standard and it crosswalks to the AI corpus, which is the right scope for it. But it means the general-security half of the map is genuinely absent from this estate, and anyone assuming "AIUC-1 covers the crosswalks" would be wrong about exactly the frameworks most enterprises are actually assessed against.
Two: four of the thirteen are laws, and three are sub-national US laws
eu-ai-act, co-ai-act, ca-sb-53, nyc-ll-144.
Colorado. California. New York City. Those are not abstractions — they are jurisdictions with UnGovr entity slugs: us/co, us/ca, us/ny/…. A crosswalk from an AIUC-1 control to the Colorado AI Act currently floats free of any statement about who in Colorado it binds.
This is the join, and it is already half-built by somebody else. AIUC-1 supplies the control → law edge. UnGovr supplies the body → jurisdiction anchor. Nobody has connected them, and the connection is one edge.
And they already use anchor nodes
The crosswalk edges do not point at frameworks. They point at anchor: nodes — anchor:co-ai-act:6-1-1702-developer-duties — reached by an anchors_to edge, of which there are 489.
So the anchor pattern is established in this estate and this pack is not proposing it. What it proposes is a different axis of anchor: theirs anchor provisions across standards; ours would anchor obligations to the body and the place. The two compose; neither replaces the other. File 01 [link removed: 01__the-anchor-node-thesis.md:] is right about the principle and was wrong to imply the estate had not applied it.
The candidate list — named, not inventoried
Nothing in this table has been checked. No structure, no licence, no machine-readable source, no count. Every cell would start unevidenced.
| Family | Candidates | Why it matters here |
|---|---|---|
| General security control sets | NIST CSF 2.0 · NIST SP 800-53 · ISO/IEC 27001 & 27002 · SOC 2 TSC · CIS Controls | The real gap. Confirmed absent from AIUC-1's thirteen, and the set most enterprises are assessed against |
| Sectoral | PCI DSS · HIPAA Security Rule · FedRAMP · DORA | Scope is defined by what the body does — the entity anchor's type field carries part of this |
| EU regulatory, beyond the AI Act | NIS2 · the Cyber Resilience Act | Where the jurisdiction anchor earns its place: scope clauses keyed to entity type and member state |
| Already covered by AIUC-1 | CSA AICM · ISO 42001 · NIST AI RMF · MITRE ATLAS · OWASP · EU AI Act · CO · CA · NYC | Do not redraw. Fork the crosswalks byte for byte, as the conformance layer forked the catalogue |
The licence question comes before the parse, every time. This vault learned that the expensive way: UnGovr's AI-law corpus reads as part of a CC BY 4.0 API and carries its own licence saying "No license is conveyed by receipt of this file." Several standards bodies charge for the text. A graph of ids, structure and crosswalks without the text is still useful — but that has to be a decision made before the work.
What the anchor changes, per family
The point of the map is not the list. It is what a jurisdiction anchor does to it:
| Question, today | Question, with the anchor |
|---|---|
| Which controls does ISO 27001 A.5.15 map to? | unchanged — a crosswalk, and AIUC-1 already answers this shape |
| Does NIS2 apply to us? | a query over governed_by, not a lawyer's reading of a scope clause |
| Which obligations bind this specific body? | answerable, and currently not expressible at all |
| What is the evidence state of each? | answerable, with unevidenced as the honest default |
| Two bodies, same standard — comparable? | yes, because the subject is a node rather than a string |
Only the first row works today. The other four are what the anchor is for.
The order of work, and it is not the obvious one
- The anchors. UnGovr entity + jurisdiction, with the
governed_byedge marked inferredand its 96.6% / 20.5% measured. This vault has already done this for one jurisdiction.
- One instrument, already solved. The EU AI Act current text — per-provision ids and hashes
exist, so this is a join and not a parse. Do not re-parse what RiskMandate has parsed.
- One standard, already graphed. AIUC-1. Do not re-transcribe it; fork it the way the
conformance layer forked it, byte for byte.
- One crosswalk edge,
std:control --addresses--> sg:obligation, drawn once, by hand,for one control, and marked inferred.
- Only then widen — and widening means another anchor, not another standard.
A crosswalk built before step 1 is a mapping between two vocabularies with nothing underneath it. That is the failure mode thesis sentence 5 names, and it is why this order is strict.
What would make this file wrong
| If this turns out to be true | Then |
|---|---|
| Checked, and no. They are AI-specific; the general-security half is genuinely missing. Four of the thirteen are laws, three of them sub-national US, which is where the anchor pays off first | |
| A standards body publishes machine-readable jurisdiction scope | Their binding beats our inference. Cite it and delete our edge |
| The estate's existing graphs disagree on the EU AI Act's structure | Two independent parses of one law disagreeing is a finding worth publishing, not a defect to hide |
| Most candidates forbid redistribution | The graph carries ids, structure and crosswalks and not the text — and says so on its face |
This document is released under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0).